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This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of two rules for comparing alternative 
sets of objects on the basis of the diversity that they offer. The framework considered 
assumes a finite universe of objects and an a priori given ordinal quadernary relation 
that compares alternative pairs of objects on the basis of their ordinal dissimilarity. 
Very few properties of this quadernary relation are assumed (beside completeness, 
transitivity and a very natural form of symmetry). The two rules that we characterize are 
the maxi-max criterion and the lexi-max criterion. The maxi-max criterion considers 
that a set is more diverse than another if and only if the two objects that are the most 
dissimilar in the former are weakly as dissimilar as the two most dissimilar objects in 
the later. The lexi-max criterion is defined as usual as the lexicographic extension of the 
maxi-max criterion. Some connections with the broader issue of measuring freedom of 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Would the killing of 50 000 thousand ﬂies of a speciﬁcs p e c i e sh a v et h e
same impact on the reduction of biological diversity than that of 200 white
rhinoceros ? Is the diversity of opinions expressed in the written press larger
in France than in the US ? Is the choice of models of cars oﬀered by a
particular retailer more diverse than that of another ? These are examples
of questions whose answers require a precise notion of diversity.
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1Biologists have probably been the ﬁrst scientists interested in develop-
ing and implementing numerical indices that aim at measuring the biological
diversity oﬀered by alternative ecosystems. One of the most widely used of
these indices is Shannon (1948) weighted entropy measure proposed in bi-
ology by Good (1953) (see e.g. Baczkowski, Joanes and Shamia (1997),
Baczkowski, Joanes and Shamia (1998) and Magurran (1998) for other re-
ﬁnements and discussions of this class of indices). The generalized Good
index evaluates the diversity of any ecosystem by counting, for each species,
the frequency of living individuals within the species relative to the total
number of living individuals and calculates a weighted entropy over these
relative frequencies. Yet, and despite its wide use and computational con-
venience for applications, this index lacks sound justiﬁcations. Why after
all should one use the speciﬁc entropy formula for appraising the impact of
major changes on biodiversity ? Answering questions like this is important
in these days where many countries who have ratiﬁe dt h eU N1 9 9 2c o n v e n -
tion on biological diversity have adopted economically costly environmental
regulations in order to prevent a deterioration of biological diversity caused
by human activities. It is all the most important as the generalized entropy
measure suﬀers from the drawback of paying no attention whatsoever to
either inter-species dissimilarities, or to the possibility for two individuals
of the same species to be more dissimilar than two individuals coming from
diﬀerent species. For instance, according to the generalized entropy formula,
a world in which all living individuals are equally split between two species
of ﬂy is just as diverse as one in which the living individuals are split equally
between chimpanzees and hippocampi.
Recent eﬀorts, actually due to economists (Weitzman (1992),Weitzman
(1993), Weitzman (1998)), have been made to provide axiomatic founda-
tions to the measurement of biodiversity. Weitzman approach is based on
the primitive notion of a cardinal numerical measure of distance between liv-
ing creatures. Such a numerical distance enables one to say things such as
“the biological distance between a chimpanzee and a bee is twice as large as
the biological distance between a rainbow trout and a kokanee salmon”. Us-
ing such a numerical distance, Weitzman (1992) axiomatically characterizes
a sophisticated iterative lexicographic method for appraising the diversity
oﬀered by a set of living individuals. Using a somewhat diﬀerent setting,
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (2002) also provide an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the Weitzman’s method by taking as given a cardinal numerical
measure of distances between the objects. Weitzman’s procedure has been
substantially generalized in a recent paper by Nehring and Puppe (2002)
who propose to derive the basic numerical distance function assumed by
Weitzman from an ap r i o r igrouping of the objects into collections of “at-
tributes” (for instance being a mammal), each attributed being weighted by
a (cardinally meaningful) numerical function.
Weitzman or Nehring and Puppe procedure, by taking due account of
2the (possibly) diﬀerent distances that may exist between alternative pairs of
living creatures, is clearly sensitive to inter-species dissimilarities. It also al-
lows for the possibility of two individuals of a particular species (chimpanzee
for instance) to be more diverse than two individuals coming from diﬀerent
species. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the current state of
knowledge in biology leads to such a precise cardinal measure of distance
between living creatures as what is required by these approaches. Much biol-
ogists would probably agree that a chimpanzee and a bee are more dissimilar
than a rainbow trout and a kokanee salmon. But would they agree to say
that the dissimilarity between a chimpanzee and a bee is twice that between
a rainbow trout and a kokanee salmon ? Does the discriminating power of
current biology enable one to perform such precise cardinal statements ?
In the last 15 years or so, interest in diversity measurement has also
arisen in non-welfarist normative economics, in connection with the issue
of comparing alternative opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of
choice (see e.g. Arrow (1995), Bossert (1997), Bossert (2000), Bossert, Pat-
tanaik and Xu (1994), Dutta and Sen (1996), Foster (1993), Gravel (1994),
Gravel (1998), Gravel, Laslier and Trannoy (1998), Jones and Sugden (1982),
Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Kreps (1979), Nehring and Puppe (1999), Pat-
tanaik and Xu. (1990), Pattanaik and Xu (1998), Pattanaik and Xu (2000b),
Puppe (1995), Puppe (1996), Puppe (1998), Puppe and Xu (1996), Sen
(1988), Sen (1991), Sugden (1985), Suppes (1987), Suppes (1996) and Van-
Hees (1997) for representative pieces of this literature and Barberà, Bossert
and Pattanaik (n.d.), Foster (2001) and Sugden (1998) for surveys). A major
weakness of many rankings of opportunity sets examined in this literature
is their insensitivity to the diversity of the options contained in opportunity
sets. Even if the fact of being forced (by lack of available alternative) to
drive a blue car to go to some destination can be considered freedom-wise
equivalent to being forced to make the same trip by train, this does not im-
ply that the possibility of getting to destination by driving either a blue or a
red car oﬀers the same freedom of choice as having the possibility of making
the trip either by train or by a red car. Yet many rankings of opportunity
sets examined in the literature fail to make the distinction.
While the present paper is primarily concerned with the issue of mea-
suring diversity, it does provide some indication as to how the measurement
of diversity may interfere with that of freedom of choice. Speciﬁcally, the
object of this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of two rank-
ings of sets on the sole basis of the diversity that they oﬀer. As in Weitzman
(1992),Weitzman (1993), Weitzman (1998) , Bossert et al. (2002) and, to
some extent, Nehring and Puppe (2002), the two rankings characterized in
this paper are based on an ap r i o r inotion of “proximity”, or “dissimilarity”,
between the objects that is taken as given. However, the notion of similarity
on which our axioms are based requires less information than what is nec-
essary to deﬁne a cardinally meaningful numerical distance function such as
3that used in these contributions. Rather, the primitive notion of similarity on
which we base our axiomatic construction is ordinal. That is, it requires the
ability to perform statements like “the biological distance between a chim-
panzee and a bee is larger than the biological distance between a rainbow
trout and a kokanee salmon” but does not suppose the capacity of quanti-
fying further these statements. In particular, it does not require the ability
to make statements like “the biological distance between a chimpanzee and
a bee is twice the distance between a rainbow trout and a kokanee salmon”
that are required by a cardinal notion and which, in our view, exceed the
current discriminating power of humans, even in disciplines as developed
and sophisticated as biology.
To the best of our knowledge, Pattanaik and Xu (2000a) contribution,
also discussed in Bossert et al. (2002), is the only one that examines a
diversity-based ranking of sets of objects that refers explicitly to an ap r i o r i
ordinal notion of similarity. However, the ordinal notion of similarity as-
sumed in these papers is rather crude. For it only allows objects to be either
pairwise dissimilar or pairwise similar. No intermediate categories of simi-
larities are allowed. With this “zero-one” notion of similarity, Pattanaik and
Xu (2000a) characterizes a ranking of sets based on the number of elements
contained in the smallest (with respect to the number of elements) partition
of the sets in subsets of similar objects. According to their ranking, set A
oﬀe r sa tl e a s ta sm u c hd i v e r s i t ya ss e tB if, and only if, the smallest partition
of A into subsets of similar objects contains at least as many elements as the
corresponding partition in B. While very interesting as a ﬁrst step in the
process of building a diversity ranking of sets based on an ordinal notion of
similarity, this result suﬀers obviously from the paucity of the information
conveyed by the “zero-one” notion of similarity used.
In this paper we characterize axiomatically two diversity rankings of sets
based on an ordinal primitive notion of similarity that is not assumed to be
“zero-one”. Rather, the primitive notion of similarity used in this paper is
an abstract quadernary relation (or a binary relation on the set of all pairs
of objects) that is only restricted to be reﬂexive, transitive and complete
as well as to satisfy a weak form of symmetry. Using this notion, the ﬁrst
ranking that we characterize is the maxi-max criterion that compares sets on
the basis of the dissimilarity of their two most dissimilar objects. The other
ranking characterized in this paper is the lexi-max criterion that is deﬁned,
as usual, as the lexicographic extension of the maxi-max one. It therefore
compares any two sets by ﬁrst comparing their two most dissimilar objects in
terms of dissimilarity and, in case of a tie between these two most dissimilar
objects, by looking at their two second most dissimilar objects and, if a tie
is also obtained there, at their third most dissimilar pair and so on.
While these two rankings, and especially the second one, are of intrinsic
interest for the problem at hand, we believe that the general methodology
employed for obtaining a consistent method for assessing diversity on the
4basis of a primitive ordinal notion of similarity is more important than the
rankings themselves. We further illustrate this by showing how our approach
to diversity measurement can shed light on some aspects of the problem of
ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice. For this
sake, we adopt Pattanaik and Xu (1998) framework in which the freedom of
choice oﬀered by alternative opportunity sets is appraised by referring to a
set of possible preference orderings that a reasonable person can have (see
also Foster (1993), Nehring and Puppe (1999) or Puppe (1998) for other
use and/or interpretation of this multiple preferences approach to freedom
of choice). In this framework, the options of an opportunity set that are
maximal with respect to some of the possible preference orderings is typically
considered to be a suﬃcient information for appraising the freedom of choice
oﬀered by that opportunity set. Following this tradition, we provide in this
paper an axiomatic characterization of a ranking of opportunity sets that
compares their sets of maximal options with respect to some of the possible
preference orderings by means of the maxi-max criterion alluded to above.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the notation and the formal deﬁnitions of the axioms and the rankings char-
acterized for the purpose of diversity measurement. Section 3 presents and
brieﬂy discusses the main characterization results that concern diversity
measurement. Section 4 explores some of the connections between diversity
and freedom of choice measurement and section 5 concludes.
2N o t a t i o n s a n d d e ﬁnitions1
Let X be a ﬁnite set of options (living individuals, type of means of trans-
portations, opinions expressed in newspapers, etc.) and P(X) be the set of
all non empty subsets of X with generic elements A, B,....
At the basis of our approach is a quadernary relation Q on X (alterna-
tively, a binary relation on X×X) (with asymmetric and symmetric factors
QA and QS respectively) which reﬂects an ordinal a priori knowledge that
one can have about the dissimilarity that exists between options. In this
light, the statement (w, z) Q (x, y) is interpreted as meaning “w is at least
as dissimilar from z than x is from y”. To motivate this interpretation, we
assume throughout that, for every distinct objects x and y ∈ X,b o t h(x, y)
Q (x,x) and (x,x) QS (y,y) hold (that is, two distinct objects are always
1The possibly non-standard notation of this paper is as follows. Given any set A,w e
denote by |A| its cardinality. By a binary relation B on a set Ω,i ti sm e a n tas u b s e to f
Ω×Ω. Following common use we write xByinstead of (x,y) ∈ B. For a binary relation
B,i t sasymmetric factor BA is deﬁned by xB A y ⇐⇒ xBy∧¬(yBx ) and its symmetric
factor BS by xB S y ⇐⇒ (xBy ) ∧ (yBx ). A binary relation B on Ω is reﬂexive if
xBxfor all x ∈ Ω,i scomplete if (xBy ) or (yBx ) holds for every x and y ∈ Ω,i s
transitive if xBzfollows from xByand yBzfor any x,y and z.Ar e ﬂexive, complete
and transitive binary relation is called an ordering.
5weakly more dissimilar than any of the two objects in isolation, and pairs of
identical objects are just equally similar (or dissimilar)). These two proper-
ties would clearly hold true if, as Weitzman (1992) or Bossert et al. (2002),
we would accept to go as far as measuring the dissimilarity by a (cardinally
measurable) distance function d : X × X → R. We assume also that Q is
symmetric in the sense that (x,y) Q (y,x) holds for every objects x and y
and, as a binary relation on X × X,i scomplete and transitive.T h er e a d e r
can verify that these properties would also be satisﬁed by the ranking of
pairs of objects induced by a conventional distance function d (in particular
d is conventionally assumed to be symmetric). In order to simplify some of
the proofs and formal statements, we further assume that Q is such that
(x, y) QA (x,x) for every two distinct x and y (two distinct options are
always strictly more dissimilar than one of the two options and itself). Al-
though there exists distance functions that violates this property, we believe
it to be fairly natural in the current context. After all, if two objects x and
y are considered to be distinct for the sake of the analysis performed, they
should be considered to have some degree of “dissimilarity”.
We let Q denote the set of all ordinal diversity quadernary relations that
satisfy all these properties. We record the obvious following fact (whose
proof is omitted).
Fact 1 If Q is a dissimilar quadernary relation in Q, then, for all distinct
x and y ∈ X,a n df o ra l lz ∈ X, (x,y) QA (z,z)
Given a diversity quadernary relation Q and a set P ⊆ X × X of pairs
of objects of X,w ed e n o t eb yOQ(P) the arrangement of the pairs in P
in decreasing order of dissimilarity. That is OQ(P)={a(1),...,a(|P|)} where,
for every i =1 ,...,|P| − 1, a(i) ∈ P, a(i+1) ∈ P and a(i) Qa (i+1).A sQ is
symmetric, there is some arbitrariness in numbering the elements of OQ(P)
as the order of appearance of any two symmetric pairs (x,y) and (y,x) is
irrelevant.
Let now º (with asymmetric and symmetric factors Â and ∼ respec-
tively) be a transitive binary relation on P(X) that aims at reﬂecting the
evaluation of the diversity oﬀered by alternatives sets of objects in P(X).
We interpret the statement A º B as meaning “the set A oﬀers at least as
much diversity as the set B”.
We wish to propose plausible properties (axioms) that º could satisfy in
order to serve as a sensible method for appraising diversity, taking as given
the ordinal notion of dissimilarity embodied in Q. In order to formulate
these, we deﬁne as follows, for every set A ∈ P(X), and any pair of objects
x, y ∈ X,t h es e t sWDA(x,y) and DA(x,y) of pairs of elements of A that
are, respectively, weakly more diverse and strictly more diverse than x and
y.
Deﬁnition 1 WDA(x,y)={(a,a0) ∈ A × A :( a,a0) Q (x,y)}
6Deﬁnition 2 DA(x,y)={(a,a0) ∈ A × A :( a,a0) QA (x,y)}
We now present the axioms used in the characterizations by what seems,
in our view, to be their decreasing order of intuitive plausibility.
Axiom 1 ∀ w,x, y, z ∈ X, (w, z) Q (x, y) ⇐⇒ {w, z}º{ x, y}.
Axiom 2 ∀ A, B ∈ P(X), if A ⊇ B,t h e nA º B.
Axiom 3 ∀ A, B, C and D ∈ P(X) such that B∩ C = B∩ D = C∩D = ∅,
(A º B∪C, A º B∪D and A º C∪D)= ⇒ A º B∪C∪D and (A Â (B∪C),
A Â (B ∪ D) and A Â (C ∪ D)) =⇒ A Â (B ∪ C ∪ D).
Axiom 4 ∀ A, B ∈ P(X) such that |A| = |B| a(i) Qb (i) ∀ i with a(i) ∈
OQ(A × A) and b(i) ∈ OQ(B × B)= ⇒ A º B.





¯ ¯ and a(i) Qb (i) for
a(i) ∈ OQ(WDA∪{w,z}(w,z)), b(i) ∈ OQ(WDB ∪{x,y}(x,y)) and i =1 ,..., ¯ ¯WDA∪{w,z}(w,z)
¯ ¯,t h e nA ∪ {w,z}ºB ∪ {x,y}.





¯ ¯ and a(i) QA b(i) for
a(i) ∈ OQ(DA∪{w,z}(w,z)), b(i) ∈ OQ(DB ∪{x,y}(x,y)) and i ∈ 1,..., ¯ ¯DA∪{w,z}(w,z)
¯ ¯ then A ∪ {w,z}ÂB ∪ {x,y}.





¯ ¯ and a(i) Qb (i) for
a(i) ∈ OQ(WDA∪{w,z}(w,z)), b(i) ∈ OQ(WDB ∪{x,y}(x,y)) and i ∈ 1,..., ¯ ¯WDA∪{w,z}(w,z)
¯ ¯ then A ∪ {w,z}ÂB ∪ {x,y}.
Axiom 1 just says that the ranking of sets made of two elements in
terms of diversity must coincide with the ranking of the pairs in terms of
dissimilarity as per the quadernary relation Q.I t i s d i ﬃcult to imagine a
diversity-ranking of sets based on an ap r i o r inotion of dissimilarity between
options that would violate this axiom. Notice carefully that the formal
statement of axiom 1 does not require the options w, x, y and z to be
distinct.2 Hence, when employed with a quadernary relation belonging to
Q, axiom 1 implies the widely discussed (at least in the freedom of choice
literature) Pattanaik and Xu. (1990)’s axiom of indiﬀerence to no choice
situation saying that singleton sets should be considered equivalent. It also
implies that any pair made of two distinct elements is strictly more diverse
than any singleton.
2Hence, axiom 1 is formulated with a slight abuse of notation since, for x = y,t h es e t
{x,y} is, in fact, the singleton {x} (or {y}).
7Axiom 2 is also well-known in the freedom of choice literature and is very
natural in that context. It seems also plausible in the context of diversity
measurement although perhaps not as much. At ﬁr s ts i g h t ,i ts e e m si n d e e d
diﬃcult to imagine a plausible conception of diversity that would consider
that adding an object to a set could reduce its diversity. After all, if the
added object is considered diﬀerent, as an object, from those already con-
tained in the set, how could its addition reduce the diversity of the world
? Yet the weighted enthropy indices used by biologists violate this axiom
and, at second sight, one can see how a plausible “relativist” conception of
diversity could, in some circumstances, contradict the partial ranking of sets
provided by inclusion. Suppose a world in which the population of living in-
dividuals is equally split between two species 1 and 2. Consider now adding
to this population a large number of living individuals of species 1 in such a
way that the ratio of individuals from species 2 over those of species 1 be-
comes negligible. A “relativist” conception of biological diversity according
to which diversity is maximized when all living individuals are equally split-
up among the diﬀerent categories could plausibly consider such a change as
a reduction in diversity. To that extent, the rankings characterized in this
paper are not relativist as they both satisfy axiom 2.
Axiom 3 is, perhaps, more disputable than the two preceding ones but is
not unreasonable. Consider two sets A and B such that A is considered more
diverse (weakly or strictly) than B.C o n s i d e rt h e nt w op r o c e s s e so fa d d i n ga
bunch of options to B. One process consists in adding to B options collected
into a set C while the other process consists in adding to B options gathered
into some other set D (disjoint from C). Assume that the enlargement of
diversity oﬀered by B a sar e s u l to fe i t h e ro ft h e s et w op r o c e s si si n s u ﬃcient
to reverse the relative ranking of the enlarged set with respect to A.I n a
situation like this, the axiom requires that, if A oﬀers weakly or strictly more
diversity than that provided by all options added to B by the two processes,
then A should also be considered (weakly or strictly) more diverse than B
enlarged by all objects in the two sets C and D.T og i v eas o m e w h a tm o r e
intuitive example, assume that A consists in all currently living creatures
categorized as mammals, B contains all cartilaginous ﬁshes, C contains all
osseous ﬁshes and D consists in all batracians. Axiom 3 would then require
that if the diversity oﬀered by mammals is larger than that oﬀered by all
ﬁshes (cartilaginous and osseous), is larger than that oﬀered by cartilaginous
ﬁshes and batracians and is also larger than that oﬀered by all batracians
and osseous ﬁsh, then the set of all mammals should also be considered more
diverse than the set of all ﬁshes and batracians.
Axiom 4 connects, for sets that contain the same number of options, the
judgements made with respect to the dissimilarity of their options and those
with respect to their relative standing in terms of diversity. As sets with
t h es a m en u m b e ro fo p t i o n sh a v et h es a m en u m b e ro fp a i r s ,t h e ya l s oh a v e
the same number of positions occupied by the pairs in terms of dissimilarity.
8Suppose that a set A dominates a set B in the sense that, for any position
occupied by a pair in the scale of dissimilarity, the pair that occupies that
position in A is weakly more dissimilar than the corresponding pair in B.
A x i o m4w o u l dt h e nr e q u i r es e tA to oﬀer weakly more diversity than B.
Axioms 5 to 7 are slight variant of the same principle and are probably
the more diﬃcult to accept (and to understand). They say that if a pair of
objects is considered more diverse (strictly for axioms 6 and 7 or weakly for
axiom 5) than another, then the ranking of the pair in terms of diversity
should be robust to certain form of addition of options to both sets. The
restriction imposed on the addition of options is that all the new pairs of
options that they create that are (weakly for axioms 5 and 7 or strictly for
axiom 6) more dissimilar, in each set, than the initial pair should be in same
number in both sets and should be related, pair by pair, by a dominance
relation with respect to dissimilarity. Here again, an example may help. As-
sume that the diversity ranking of sets considers the pair {bee,chimpanzee}
to be strictly more diverse than the pair {kokanee salmon, rainbow trout}.
Suppose we add a fly to the ﬁrst set and a brown trout to the second set
and assume that the following (plausible) dissimilarity statements hold with
respect to the living individuals:
1) a chimpanzee is weakly more similar to a bee than to a ﬂy,
2) a bee is weakly more similar to a ﬂy than to a chimpanzee,
3) a kokanee salmon is closer to a rainbow trout than to a brown trout,
4) brown and rainbow trouts are more similar than a rainbow trout and
a kokanee salmon,
5) kokanee salmon and brown trout are more similar than chimpanzee
and ﬂy.
We note that, in this example, the addition of the ﬂyt ot h eﬁrst set and
of the brown trout to the second set creates only, in each set, one pair of
objects that are (strictly in this example) more dissimilar than the original
pairs. These pairs are (chimpanzee, fly) for the ﬁrst set and (brown trout,
kokanee salmon) for the second. We note also that the ﬁrst of these pairs is
strictly more diverse than the second one. Axioms 6 and 7 would then require
in this example the set {bee, chimpanzee, fly}to be strictly more diverse
than the set {brown trout, kokanee salmon, rainbow trout} while axiom 5
would only require {bee, chimpanzee, fly} t ob ew e a k l ym o r ed i v e r s et h a n
{brown trout, kokanee salmon, rainbow trout}.
It should be noticed that, despite their similar looking aspect, axioms
5 to 7 are pairwise independent. Only axiom 7 plays a crucial role in the
characterization of the lexi-max criterion. Axioms 5 and 6 are only brought
in to illustrate, in an alternative characterization of the maxi-max criterion
presented below, the formal diﬀerences that distinguish the maxi-max and
the lexi-max criteria as methods for comparing sets on the basis of their
diversity.
We now turn formally to the deﬁnitions of these rankings. The ﬁrst of
9these rankings is the maxi-max criterion that ranks sets according to the
relative dissimilarities of their most dissimilar pairs. This ranking ºmaxis
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 For all A, B ∈ P(X),Aºmax B ⇐⇒ a(1) Qb (1) for a(1) ∈
OQ(A × A) and b(1) ∈ OQ(B × B).
To illustrate, suppose that X is the set of all means of transportation
available to perform a certain trip between two cities deﬁned speciﬁcally as
X = {train, car,bike, foot}. Assume also that the ordinal notion of dissim-
ilarities between these means of transportations is given by the quadernary
relation Q deﬁned by (train,foot) QA (car,foot) QA (train,bike) QA (car,bike)
QA (train, car) QA (bike,foot). Then the maxi-max criterion would con-
sider that the set {train,foot} oﬀe r sj u s ta sm u c hd i v e r s i t ya st h es e t{train,
car,bike, foot}, a judgement which may sounds at odd with one’s intuition
of what is diversity. Its biggest weakness is obviously to focus only on the
two most dissimilar objects in the sets and to ignore completely the contri-
bution to diversity made by the presence of less dissimilar objects.
The lexi-max criterion %lex that will now be deﬁned avoids to some
extent this weakness. The formal statement of the deﬁnition exploits the
obvious fact that, for every set A, |A × A| = |A|
2 as well as the property
stated in fact 1.
Deﬁnition 4 For all A, B ∈ P(X), A Âlex B ⇐⇒ ∃ k ∈ {1,...,|A|(|A| −
1)} such that a(k) QA b(k) and a(i) QS b(i) for i =1 ,...k − 1 and A ∼lex
B ⇐⇒ |A| = |B| and a(i) QS b(i) for i =1 ,...,|B|
2 where, for every j,
a(j) ∈ OQ(A × A) and b(j) ∈ OQ(B × B)
Albeit this ranking expresses some sensitivity with respect to the contri-
butions of options that are not maximally dissimilar to diversity (for instance
by considering that the set {train, car,bike, foot} is strictly more diverse
than the pair {train,foot}), this sensitivity is not as great as one would like.
For it nonetheless gives a “veto power” to the most dissimilar two objects
in the sets with respect to the appraisal of their diversity. In the example
above, the set {train,foot} would be considered strictly more diverse than
the sets {train, car, bike} and the sets {car,bike,foot} as per the criterion
%lex even though this judgement may hurt the intuition of someone who
nonetheless accepts the notion of dissimilarity Q a s s u m e di nt h i se x a m p l e .
It would therefore be nice to have a diversity ranking that enables more
trade-oﬀ between the contributions of alternative pairs of options to diversity
than what is allowed by the two diversity orderings characterized in this
paper.
We now turn to the characterization.
103 Characterization results for diversity measure-
ment
We ﬁrst provide the characterization of ºmaxby means of axioms 1-3.
Theorem 1 Let º be transitive binary relation deﬁned on P(X) and let Q
be an ordinal notion of similarity belonging to Q.T h e nº satisﬁes Axioms
1 t o3i fa n do n l yi f º = ºmax
Proof. Necessity. It is immediate to see that the transitive binary
relation ºmaxsatisﬁes axioms 1 and 2. As for axiom 3, suppose that A ºmax
B∪C = E, A ºmax B∪D = F andA ºmax C∪D = G and letH = B∪C∪
D. Then a(1) Qe (1),a (1) Qf (1) and a(1) Qg (1) for a(1),e (1),f (1) and g(1)
denoting, respectively, the ﬁrst element of the sets OQ(A×A),O Q(E ×E),
OQ(F×F) and OQ(G×G). We therefore have a(1) Q maxQ(e(1),f (1),g (1))=
maxQ H × H and, therefore, A ºmax H.
Suﬃciency. We ﬁrst show that if º is transitive and satisﬁes axioms 1 to
3, then we have, for every A and B ∈ P(X), A º B =⇒ A ºmax B. Suppose
A º B and let a(1) =( a1,a 2) and b(1) =( b1,b 2) denote the most dissimilar
p a i r so fo b j e c t si nA and B r e s p e c t i v e l y .B ya x i o m2 ,w eh a v eB º{ b1,b 2}
and by transitivity, A º{ b1,b 2}. In the trivial case where |B| = |A| =1 ,
we can write that A = {x} and B = {y} for some options x and y so that
a(1) =( x,x) and b(1) =( y,y).S i n c e(x,x) QS (y,y) for every x, y ∈ X,w e
therefore have a(1) Qb (1) and A ºmax B in this case. We can rule out the case
where |A| =1and |B| ≥ 2 which would imply that {x}º{ b1,b 2} for some
distinct b1 and b2 ∈ B, in contradiction with axiom 1 and fact 1. Assume
now that |A| =2and, therefore, that A = {a1,a 2}. Then {a1,a 2}º{ b1,b 2}
and by axiom 1, a(1) Qb (1), which implies A ºmax B. As the last case,
assume that |A| > 2,w r i t eA = {a1,...,a|A|} and assume by contradiction
that a(1) Qb (1) is false. Since Q is complete, this amounts to assuming that
b(1) QA a(1) and, therefore, that b(1) QA (ai,a j) for all i, j ∈ {1,...,|A|}.P i c k
any option a1 in A.O n eh a sb ya x i o m1t h a t{b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a i}, {b1,b 2}Â
{a1,a j} and {b1,b 2}Â{ ai,a j} for all i, j ∈ {1,...,|A|}.B ya x i o m3 ,w em u s t
have {b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a i,a j}. Redoing the same procedure while replacing the
option aj by some option ah ∈ A, one obtains that {b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a i,a h}.
Using axiom 3 again and the fact that {b1,b 2}Â{ aj,a h}, one is led to
the conclusion that {b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a h,a i,a j}. Redoing the last procedure
if necessary while replacing ah by ag ∈ A, one can analogously obtain the
statement {b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a g,a i,a j} and combining the last two statements
and the fact that {b1,b 2}Â{ ag,a h}, one obtains again by axiom 3 that
{b1,b 2}Â{ a1,a g,a h,a i,a j}. This procedure can clearly be repeated with as
many options in A as needed to ﬁnally obtain, using transitivity of º and
axiom 2, the required contradictory conclusion that B º{ b1,b 2}ÂA.
11We now show that for every sets A and B in P(X), A ºmax B implies
A º B for every transitive binary relation º on P(X) satisfying axioms
1t o3 .S u p p o s eA ºmax B. Then a(1) Qb (1) where again a(1) =( a1,a 2)
and b(1) =( b1,b 2) denote the most dissimilar pairs of objects in A and B
respectively. Let |B| = m and write B = {b1,b 2,...,bm}.F o rt h es a m er e a s o n
as above, we can rule out from the start the case m =1 .I fm =2 ,t h e n ,




,s ot h a t ,b y
transitivity, A º B. For the other cases, we show the result by induction.
For that purpose, we start with the case m =3and we write B = {b1,b 2,b 3}.
Becausea(1) Qb (1),w eh a v ea(1) Q (b1,b 2), a(1) Q (b1,b 3)and a(1) Q (b2,b 3).
Using axiom 1, we can write {a1,a 2}º{ b1} ∪ {b2}, {a1,a 2}º{ b1} ∪ {b3}
and {a1,a 2}º{ b2}∪{b3}.By axiom 3, it follows that {a1,a 2}º{ b1}∪{b2}∪
{b3} = B and, by axiom 2 and transitivity, that A º B. The case m =3
is then proved. Now suppose the result is true for any m ∈ {3,...,|X| − 1}.
That is, suppose that if A is a set in P(X) and B is another set in P(X) such
that |B| = m,t h e n A ºmax B =⇒ A º B and suppose A ºmax B0 where
B0 = B ∪ {bm+1} for some bm+1 ∈ X\B. We wish to show that A º B0
Let b0
(1) denote the pair of two most dissimilar objects in B0 and write
B = {b1,b 2,...,bm−1},C= {bm} and D = {bm+1}.A s ºmax is transitive
and satisﬁe sa x i o m2 , w eh a v et h a tA ºmax B ∪C and, since
¯ ¯B ∪ C
¯ ¯ = m,
we have by the induction hypothesis that A º B ∪ C.B e c a u s ea(1) Qb 0
(1)
,
we have, by the transitivity of the quadernary relation Q, a(1) Q (bm,b m+1)
and, by virtue of axioms 1 and 2 and the transitivity of º, A º C ∪ D.
Finally, let B00 = B ∪ D. Then b0
(1) Qb 00
(i) and, by transitivity of Q, a(1) Q
b00
(i) for all b00
(i) ∈ OQ(B00 ×B00).We therefore have A ºmax B00.Y e t |B00| = m
so that, by the induction hypothesis, we have A º B00. By axiom 3, we have
A º B ∪ C, A º B ∪ D and A º C ∪ D, so that A º B ∪ C ∪ D, and this
concludes the proof.
We ﬁrst remark that, albeit this was not required, we obtain the com-
pleteness of the ranking as a by-product of the axioms 1 to 3. It is also worth
noticing that this ﬁrst characterization of ºmaxis obtained from the (reason-
ably) intuitive axioms 1 to 3 that only uses properties of sets. Only axiom 1
makes the connection between the ranking of pairs in terms of dissimilarity
and the ranking of sets. Unfortunately the characterization of the more in-
teresting ºlexcriterion is not as “nice” since it is obtained from the axioms
1,4 and 7, all of which are explicitly formulated in terms of the relationship
between the diversity ranking of sets and the dissimilarity rankings of the
pairs that these sets contain.
Before turning to this characterization, we show that axioms 1, 2 and 3
used to characterize ºmaxare independent.
Proposition 1 For any Q ∈ Q,A x i o m s1 t o3a r ei n d e p e n d e n t .
12Proof. Let º∗be deﬁned by: A º∗ B ⇐⇒ b(|B|(|B|−1)) Qa (|A|(|A|−1))
where b(|B|(|B|−1)) ∈ OQ(B×B) and a(|A|(|A|−1)) ∈ OQ(A×A).This transitive
and complete binary relation on P(X) considers that set A oﬀers at least
as much diversity as B if and only if the two most similar distinct objects
in B are weakly more dissimilar than the two most similar distinct objects
in A. It is certainly a peculiar criterion for comparing sets on the basis of
their diversity. It is immediate to see that º∗violates axiom 1. To see that it
satisﬁes axiom 2, consider A and B in P(X) such that A ⊇ B.A st h et w o
most similar objects in B are also in A,w em u s th a v et h et w om o s ts i m i l a r
objects in A are weakly more similar than the two most similar objects in
B. Hence the two most similar objects in B are weakly more dissimilar than
the two most similar objects in A and, for this reason, one has A º∗ B.T o
see that º∗satisﬁes axiom 3, assume that A º∗ B∪C, A º∗ B∪D and A º∗
C ∪D.W r i t eE = B∪C, F = B∪D and G = C ∪D. One has by deﬁnition
of º∗that e(|B∪C|(|B∪C|−1)) Qa (|A|(|A|−1)), f(|B∪D|(|B∪D|−1)) Qa (|A|(|A|−1))
and g(|C∪D|(|C∪D|−1)) Qa (|A|(|A|−1)) where e(|B∪C|(|B∪C|−1)) ∈ OQ(E × E),
f(|B∪D|(|B∪D|−1)) ∈ OQ(F ×F) and g(|C∪D|(|C∪D|−1)) ∈ OQ(G×G).L e tn o w
H = B ∪C ∪D and consider h(|B∪C∪D|(|B∪C∪D|−1)) ∈ OQ(H ×H). Clearly,
since either
h(|B∪C∪D|(|B∪C∪D|−1)) = e(|B∪C|(|B∪C|−1)),




and, therefore, A º∗ B ∪ C ∪ D.N o wl e tºD be deﬁned by A ºD B ⇐⇒
a(|A|(|A|−1)) Qb (1) where a(|A|(|A|−1)) ∈ OQ(A × A) and b(1) ∈ OQ(A × A).
This rule says that set A oﬀers at least as much diversity as B if and only
if the two most similar distinct objects in A are at least as dissimilar as the
two most dissimilar distinct objects in B. It is immediate to see that ºD
satisﬁes axioms 1 and is transitive. To see that it veriﬁes axiom 3, assume
that A ºD (B ∪ C)=E, A ºD (B ∪ D)=F and A ºD C ∪ D = G.
Then a(|A|(|A|−1)) Qe (1), a(|A|(|A|−1)) Qf (1) and a(|A|(|A|−1)) Qg (1) and,
therefore, a(|A|(|A|−1)) Qh (1) where H = B ∪ C ∪ D and e(1), f(1) g(1)
and h(1) denote, respectively, the ﬁrst elements of the sets OQ(E × E),
OQ(F × F), OQ(G × G) and OQ(H × H).T o s e et h a tºD violates axiom
2, let B = {b1,b 2} and A = {b1,b 2,b 3} and assume that Q is such that
(b1,b 2) QA (b1,b 3) Q (b2,b 3).C l e a r l y ,b(1) =( b1,b 2),b (6) =( b2,b 3)
and, since (b2,b 3) Q (b1,b 2) does not hold, A ºD B does not hold either.









13some function v ∈ X × X → R+ such that, for all (w,z), (x,y) ∈ X × X,
v(w,z) ≥ v(x,y) ⇔ (w,z) Q (x,y). The existence of such a (distance)
real valued function does not pose any diﬃculty. The binary relation ºadd
is reﬂexive, transitive and complete and satisﬁes axioms 1 and 2. Yet, it
may violates axiom 3 if, for instance, X = {w,x,y,z} and v is such that
v(w,z)=7 , v(w,y)=5 ,v (w,x)=3=v(x,y).I ns u c hac a s e ,d e ﬁning
A = {w,z},B= {w}, C = {y} and D = {x},o n eh a sA ºadd B∪C ⇔ 7 ≥ 5,
A ºadd B ∪ D ⇔ 7 ≥ 3 and A ºadd C ∪ D ⇔ 7 ≥ 3.Y e tA ≺add B ∪ C ∪ D
as v(w,z)=7<v (w,y)+ v(w,x)+v(x,y)=1 1 .
We now turn to the axiomatic characterization of ºlex.
Theorem 2 Let º be a transitive binary relation on P(X) and let Q be an
ordinal notion of similarity belonging to Q.T h e n º satisﬁes Axioms 1,4
a n d7i fa n do n l yi f º = ºlex
Proof. It is immediate to verify that ºlex is a reﬂexive, transitive and
complete binary relation on P(X) that satisﬁes axioms 1, 4 and 7. Assume
now that A Âlex B. T h e n ,b yd e ﬁnition, there exists a k ∈ {1,...,(|A|(|A|−
1)} such that a(k) QA b(k) and a(i) Ib (i) for i =1 ,...k − 1 where, for all
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and a(i) Qb (i) for a(i) ∈ WD{ak
0,ak
1}∪C(a(k)) and b(i) ∈ WD{bk
0,bk
1}∪D(b(k)).
By axiom 7, we therefore have A Â B. Suppose now A ∼lex B. Then
a(i) Qb (i) ∀ i and b(i) Qa (i) ∀ i and |A| = |B| for a(i) ∈ OQ(A × A) and
b(i) ∈ OQ(B×B) .By axiom 4, we then have A º B and B º A which entails
A ∼ B. Now, we have to show that if º is transitive and satisﬁes axioms 1,
4 and 7, then we have, for every A and B ∈ P(X), A º B =⇒ A ºlex B.
Assume by contradiction that the implication is false. Then, since ºlexis
complete, this amounts to say that B Âlex A holds which, by virtue of what
we just established, implies that B Â A, a contradiction.
Although a characterization of ºlex which would, like that of ºmaxprovided
by theorem 1, only use axioms that refer to elements of the sets rather than
to pairs of elements would be more elegant, such an axiomatization is not
easy to obtain. The lexi-max criterion is a ranking of sets for which the
precise positions occupied by the pairs in the dissimilarity scale matters a
great deal. Yet, it is diﬃcult to axiomatically control these positions by
using properties of elements in the set that could be retired or added in the
spirit of axiom 3 for instance. The maxi-max criterion possesses the prop-
erty that, when it compares sets with more than two elements, the ranking
of the sets that it provides is robust to the deletion, in both sets, of speciﬁc
14elements one by one (clearly, taking away in two sets containing more than
two elements an element that is not part of the most dissimilar pair does
not aﬀect the ranking of the two sets). The lexi-max criterion does not pos-
sess this robustness with respect to the deletion of its elements. Suppose for
instance that A = {t,u,v}, B = {w,x,y,z} with the dissimilarity ranking
of the relevant pairs as follows:
(t,u) QS (t,v) QS (w,x) QS (y,z) QA (u,v) QA (w,y) QS (x,z) QS
(w,z) QS (x,y).
Here, A Âlex B but there is no way to withdraw options from both A
and B (or from A only) that would preserve the ranking. This diﬃculty
of decomposing the properties of the ranking of sets ºlex into more basic
properties involving only the sets and their elements - as in standard set
theory - is, we believe, a signiﬁcant one.
It is to a large extent our ability to escape from such a diﬃculty in
t h ec a s eo ft h eºmaxcriterion, but not in the case of ºlex, that explains
the rather diﬀerent axiomatic routes used to characterize, in theorem 1
and 2, the two similar looking rankings. It is however possible to provide an
alternative - but admittedly uglier - characterization of ºmaxthat emphasizes
the similarity that exists between this ranking and ºlex.T h i sa l t e r n a t i v e
characterization is provided in the next theorem.
Theorem 3 Let º be a transitive binary relation deﬁned on P(X) and let
Q be an ordinal notion of similarity belonging to Q.T h e nº satisﬁes Axioms
1, 5 and 6 if and only if º = ºmax.
Proof. We know that ºmax is transitive and satisﬁes axiom 1.I ti s
immediate to see that it satisﬁes axioms 5 and 6 (notice that it does not
satisfy axiom 7). Suppose that A Âmax B. Then a(1) QA b(1) where a(1) =
(a1,a 2) and b(1) =( b1,b 2) denote the most dissimilar pairs of objects in A
and B respectively. By axiom 1,w eh a v et h a t{a1,a 2}Â{ b1,b 2}. Now,
let C = A \{ a1,a 2} and D = B \{ b1,b 2}. Trivially, C and D are just
like the sets A and B in axiom 6 with, in particular
¯ ¯DC ∪{a1,a2}(a1,a 2)
¯ ¯ = ¯ ¯DD ∪{b1,b2}(b1,b 2)
¯ ¯ =0 . Hence we can apply axiom 6 trivially to obtain
A = C ∪ {a1,a 2}ÂD ∪ {b1,b 2} = B.S u p p o s en o wA ∼max B.T h e n ,
using the same notation, we have a(1) QS b(1) which entails by axiom 1 that
{a1,a 2}º{ b1,b 2} and also {b1,b 2}º{ a1,a 2}.U s i n gt h es a m e( t r i v i a l )
reasoning than for the preceding case but with axiom 5 instead, we obtain
A º B as well as B º A and, therefore, A ∼ B. We now wish to prove that
if A º B for all transitive binary relations on P(X) that satisfy axioms 1,5
and 6, then A ºmax B. Suppose not. Since ºmaxis complete, this amounts
to assuming that B Âmax A. Yet by what has just been established above,
this implies B Â A for all transitive binary relations on P(X) that satisfy
axioms 1, 5 and 6, a contradiction.
We conclude this section by proving that axioms 1, 4 and 7 used in the
characterization of ºlex are independent.
15Proposition 2 For any Q ∈ Q,a x i o m s1, 4 and 7 are independent.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst ºadd as deﬁned in the proof of proposition 1.
It satisﬁes as we have seen axiom 1 and it is not hard to see that it also
satisﬁes axiom 4. To see that it violates axiom 7, consider X = {w,x,y,z}
and assume that the function v which deﬁnes ºadd is such that v(w,z)=7 ,
v(w,y)=5 ,v (w,x)=3 , 2=v(x,y)=v(x,z) and v(y,z)=0 .I ns u c ha
c a s e ,w eh a v et h a t{w,y}Â{ w,x} and the sets A = {z} = B are just as
in the antecedent of axiom 7 (with WD{w,y,z}(w,y)={(w,z),(w,y)} and
WD{w,x,z}(w,x)={(w,z),(w,x}) (neglecting the duplication of symmetric
pairs) . Yet {w,y,z}¹{ w,x,z} since 7+5+0≤ 7+3+2, which contradicts
the requirement of axiom 7. Consider now the widely discussed Pattanaik
and Xu. (1990) cardinality ordering %CARDdeﬁned by A %CARD B ⇔ |A| ≥
|B|. This ordering obviously violates axiom 1 for any dissimilarity notion
contained in Q.I ts a t i s ﬁes however axiom 4 and, trivially, axiom 7 (whose
antecedent never applies when there is universal indiﬀerence between all
pairs of objects). Consider ﬁnally the incomplete transitive binary relation
b ºlex deﬁned by A b ºlex B ⇐⇒ A Âlex B. As can be seen in the proof of
theorem 2, this binary relation satisﬁes axioms 1 and 7. Yet it fails to satisfy
axiom 4 (since b ºlex considers as non comparable any two sets, such as those
mentioned in axiom 4, that would be considered indiﬀerent by ºlex).
4 Diversity and freedom of choice
The diversity of options available for choice to a decision maker can arguably
be seen as an essential element of the freedom of choice of this decision
maker. Yet most rankings of opportunity sets examined in the freedom of
choice literature mentioned in introduction have not exhibited a great sen-
sitivity to diversity. In this section, we brieﬂy explore the extent to which
the methodology used in this paper can serve to bridge the gap between
concerns for diversity and concerns for freedom.
There are roughly two approaches to the issue of deﬁning and measuring
freedom of choice in the literature. In the ﬁrst approach, freedom of choice is
conceived as an intrinsic criterion for comparing opportunity sets, roughly
related to the “size” of the opportunity sets, and whose importance is, us-
ing the words of Sen (1988) (p. 290), “beyond that of providing the means
of choosing the particular alternative that happens to be chosen”. Hence,
in this approach, the freedom of choice oﬀered by a particular opportunity
set is conceived as being completely independent from the preferences that
the decision maker will use for choosing from that set. The widely dis-
cussed cardinality rankings of sets (characterized diﬀerently by Jones and
Sugden (1982), Pattanaik and Xu. (1990) and Suppes (1987)) as well as
their additive generalization (see e.g. Klemisch-Ahlert (1993) or Gravel et
al. (1998)) belong clearly to this approach, as do the deﬁnition of freedom
16as enthropy in Suppes (1996) or the examination, made by VanHees (1997),
of the distinction between negative and positive freedom. In the second
approach, freedom of choice is deﬁned with respect to a set of possible pref-
erences that the decision maker could have when making its choice. In this
approach, freedom of choice is important only in so far as it enables the
decision maker to make better choice from the view point of some of the
possible preference that he may use when making the choice. For this rea-
son, when evaluating the freedom of choice oﬀered by some opportunity set,
this approach attaches a particular attention to the set of options which
would be considered best in this set from the view point of some of the pos-
sible preference of the decision maker. We refer the reader to Arrow (1995),
Barberà et al. (n.d.), Dutta and Sen (1996), Foster (1993), Jones and Sug-
den (1982), Nehring and Puppe (1999), Pattanaik and Xu (1998), Puppe
(1998), Romero-Medina (2001) and Sugden (1998) for further justiﬁcation
of this multi-preferences approach to freedom of choice.
The methodology presented in this paper is directly relevant for this ﬁrst
approach if one accepts the view that the diversity of options contained in
a particular opportunity set is a natural measure of the freedom of choice
oﬀered by that opportunity set. As there is, after all, some rationale for
this view. After all someone who has only the choice between two slightly
diﬀerent cars for commuting from home to work can arguably be considered
to have less freedom of choice - in terms of means of transportation - than
an individual who can go to work either by one car or by a suburban train.
Hence it is quite possible to interpret the maxi-max and the lexi-max criteria
characterized in the preceding section as freedom of choice rankings rather
than diversity ones. Of course the acceptability of the rankings, both from
a diversity or a freedom of choice perspective, rides upon the acceptability
of the underlying dissimilarity quadernary relation that is taken a given.
But diversity can also contribute to deﬁning freedom of choice in the
context of the multi-preference approach. To see how, adopt Pattanaik and
Xu (1998) framework and let R = {R1,...,Rn} be the set of all possible
preference orderings over X that a “reasonable person” may have. For all
i =1 ,...,n,l e tPi and Ii denote, respectively, the asymmetric factor and the
symmetric factor of Ri. In this setting, the binary relation º on P(X) is
explicitly interpreted in terms of freedom of choice rather than of diversity.
For all A ∈ P(X),l e tMaxRA = {a ∈ A : ∃ Ri ∈ R for which aR i a0
∀ a0 ∈ A} be the set of all options in A that are maximal for some of the
possible preferences in R.
Taking as given the set R, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) characterizes the
ranking of all sets in P(X) deﬁned by the comparison of the cardinality of
their sets of elements which are maximal from the view point of at least
one of the possible preferences in R.F o r m a l l y ,t h i sr a n k i n gºR
card is deﬁned
by A ºR
card B ⇐⇒ |MaxRA| ≥ |MaxRB|. In this paper, taking as given
both the set of possible preferences and the primitive notion of dissimilarity
17between options Q, we provide a characterization of the ranking ºR
maxdeﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 A ºR
max B ⇐⇒ MaxRA ºmax MaxRB
Hence the ranking ºR
max considers that opportunity set A oﬀers at least
as much freedom of choice as opportunity set B i fa n do n l yi ft h es e to f
elements in A that any reasonable person would choose is at least as diverse,
i nt h es e n s eo ft h eo r d e r i n gºmaxof deﬁnition 3, than the set of options in B
that any reasonable person would choose. This ranking provides therefore an
alternative to the ranking ºR
cardof Pattanaik and Xu (1998) which attaches
intrinsic importance to the diversity of the options that a reasonable person
could choose.
The characterization that we provide of ºR
maxuses the following axioms.
Axiom 8 ∀ A, B ∈ P(X), ∀ x ∈ X, if x/ ∈ MaxRA ∪ {x}, then
[A º B ⇐⇒ A ∪ {x}ºB] and [B º A ⇐⇒ B º A ∪ {x}]
Axiom 9 ∀ w,x,y,w,z ∈ X, if and {w,z} = MaxR {w,z} and {x, y} =
MaxR {x,y} then (w, s) Q (x, y) ⇐⇒ {w, z}º{ x, y}
Axiom 10 ∀ A, B ∈ Y if B ⊆ MaxRA, then A º B
Axiom 8 has been introduced in Pattanaik and Xu (1998). It requires
that if x is an option that no reasonable preference would consider strictly
better than all options in a set A, then the ranking of A with respect to B
should not be aﬀected by the addition of x to A. Axioms 9 is a weakening
of axioms 1. Like axiom 1, axiom 3 requires the ranking of sets that are
m a d eo ft w oe l e m e n t s ,e a c ho fw h i c hb e i n gab e s tc h o i c eo v e rt h eo t h e rb y
some of the possible preferences, to coincide with the dissimilarity ranking
of the pair made of these two elements as per the quardernary relation Q.
On the other hand, and contrary to axiom 1, axiom 9 does not require the
coincidence of dissimilarity comparisons and sets comparisons for pairs in
which one element - say the fact of being beheaded at dawn - is considered
worse than the other by all preferences in R = R.I ts h o u l db en o t i c e d
that, as for axiom 1, the formal statement of axiom 9 does not require the
options to be distinct. Hence, since MaxR{x} = {x} for all x ∈ X,a x i o m9
implies also Pattanaik and Xu. (1990)’s axiom of indiﬀerence to no-choice
situations. Axiom 10 is a weakening of axiom 2 which considers that a set A
oﬀers weakly more freedom of choice than any subset of the sets of options
which, in A, could be considered best by some of the preferences in R.
These axioms, along with axiom 3, characterize the ordering ºR
max ,a s
established in the following theorem.
18Theorem 4 Let º be a transitive binary relation on P(X).T h e n º sat-
isﬁes axioms 3, 8, 9 and 10 for a given dissimilarity quadernary relation
Q ∈ Q a n dag i v e ns e tR of possible preference orderings if and only if
º = ºR
max
Proof. We leave to the reader the task of verifying that ºR
max is transi-
tive and satisﬁes axioms 3, 8, 9 and 10. We now establish that, for all transi-
tive binary relations º on P(X), A ∼R
max B =⇒ A ∼ B and A ÂR
max B
=⇒ A Â B. By a reasoning analogous to that conducted in the proof
of Theorem 2, using the completeness of ºR
max,t h i ss u ﬃces to prove the
result. For every sets A and B ∈ P(X),l e tu sw r i t eA = C ∪ MaxRA
and B = D ∪ MaxRB where C = {c1,c 2,...cl} = A\ MaxRA and D =
{d1,d 2,...,dm} = B\MaxRB.W e a l s o w r i t e MaxRA = {a1,a 2,...ag} and
MaxRB = {b1,b 2,...,bh}. We recall that, as the elements of R are or-
derings, neither MaxRA nor MaxRB is empty while either C or D can
be empty. Assume A ∼R
max B i. e. MaxRA ∼max MaxRB. Assume
ﬁrst that |MaxRA| = |MaxRB| =1 .B ya x i o m9 ,w em u s tt h e nh a v e
MaxRA ∼ MaxRB. By axiom 8, (MaxRA)∪c1 ∼ MaxRA.U s i n ga x i o m8
repeatedly with as many elements in C as necessary, we obtain A ∼ MaxRA
. Analogously, using axiom 8 with set B,w eo b t a i nB ∼ MaxRB and,
by the transitivity of º, A ∼ B. For trivial reasons, we can not have
|MaxRA| > 1 and |MaxRB| =1or |MaxRA| =1and |MaxRB| > 1 when
A ∼R
max B because of the fact that (x,y) QA (z,z) for every x, y and z
with x and y distinct. Consider therefore the last case, where |MaxRA| > 1
and |MaxRB| > 1.S i n c e MaxRA ∼max MaxRB,w eh a v ea(1) QS b(1)
where a(1) =( a1,a 2) and b(1) =( b1,b 2) are the most dissimilar pair in
MaxRA and MaxRB respectively. By axiom 9, {a1,a 2} ∼ {b1,b 1}.F o r
every ai ∈ MaxRA,w eh a v e{a1,a 2}º{ a1,a i} and {a1,a 2}º{ a2,a i}.
Furthermore, {a1,a 2}º{ a1,a 2} so that we can use axiom 3 to obtain
{a1,a 2}º{ a1,a 2,a i}. We can use the same procedure to add all the re-
maining elements from MaxRA,u n t i lw eh a v e{a1,a 2}ºMaxRA.N o w
{a1,a 2} ⊆ MaxRA so that, by axiom 10, MaxRA º{ a1,a 2} and, there-
fore, {a1,a 2} ∼ MaxRA. Applying the same treatment to B gives us
{b1,b 2} ∼ MaxRB. By transitivity, we have MaxRA ∼ MaxRB. Re-
peated use of axiom 8 guarantees, as in the ﬁrst case, that A ∼ MaxRA
and B ∼ MaxRB, which in turn, by transitivity, gives the result. As-
sume now that A ÂR
max B and, therefore, that MaxRA Âmax MaxRB.
Using the same notation as above for a(1) =( a1,a 2) and b(1) =( b1,b 2),
this means that a(1) QA b(1) which implies, by axiom 9, that {a1,a 2}Â
{b1,b 2}. As before, for every ai ∈ MaxRA,w eh a v e{a1,a 2}º{ a1,a i},
{a1,a 2}º{ a2,a i} and {a1,a 2}º{ a1,a 2} so that, by axiom 3, we obtain
{a1,a 2}º{ a1,a 2,a i}. Repeating the argument with all elements of MaxRA,
we obtain {a1,a 2}ºMaxRA and, using axiom 10, {a1,a 2} ∼ MaxRA.A s
t h es a m et r e a t m e n tc a nb ea p p l i e dt oB, we are led by transitivity to the
19statement MaxRA Â MaxRB. F i n a l l y ,a n dj u s ti nt h es a m ew a ya sb e f o r e ,
a repeated use of axiom 8 will give us A Â B,a sn e e d e d
While ºR
maxprovides a method for evaluating freedom of choice in the
multi-preference approach that incorporate a concern for diversity, it is
worth mentioning that, as its cousin ºR
card,i td o e snot satisfy the full-
ﬂedged weak monotonocity with respect to set inclusion as expressed in
axiom 2. As this property appears to be a very minimal requirement to
impose on a ranking of opportunity sets based on freedom of choice (which
conception of freedom could say that making available for choice an option
may reduce freedom of choice ?), we believe that the violation of this axiom
by both ºR
cardand ºR
maxlimits somehow the usefulness of these rankings as
appropriate measures of freedom of choice.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the possibility of deriving ax-
iomatic ranking of sets of objects on the basis of their diversity by using only
an ordinal primitive information about the similarities of the objects. This
approach is to be contrasted with the most recent sophisticated ones such
as those proposed by Weitzman (1992),Weitzman (1993), Weitzman (1998),
Nehring and Puppe (2002) or Bossert et al. (2002) which assume a cardi-
nally measurable primitive notion of similarities. While this investigation
has been proved successful, we are aware that the speciﬁc rankings which
we have characterize in this paper are not perfect. As mentioned earlier, a
basic ﬂaw with these two rankings is that they do not allow smooth trade oﬀ
between the contributions of alternative pairs of objects to diversity. Both
r a n k i n g sg i v eav e r yl a r g e“ v e t op o w e r ”t ot h et w om o s td i s s i m i l a ro p t i o n si n
the sets to compare the relative diversity that they oﬀer. It would be nice to
obtain “smoother” rankings of sets than the two characterized in this paper.
An interesting class of these rankings would be an additive one, a typical
member of which would view the diversity of as set as the sum of values
assigned to each of its pairs by a function that numerically represent, in the
sense of Debreu (1954), the binary relation R deﬁned on X×X. An example
of such a ranking is the ordering ºaddconsidered in the proof of propositions
1 and 2. Finding an axiomatic characterization of such a family of diversity
rankings is a worthwhile objective for further research.
Another one is to explore further the connections between measurement
of diversity and measurement of freedom of choice. While some comments
a n dr e s u l t sh a v eb e e np r e s e n t e di nt h el a s ts e c t i o n ,w eb e l i e v et h a tm u c h
more could be done. An interesting thing to do in that context would be to
dig further behind the “black box” of the primitive quadernary relation of
dissimilarity used to deﬁne diversity. This appears particularly important
in the context of the multiple preference approach to freedom of choice. If
20diversity is conceived in the context of a decision theoretic model, it may
well be relevant to connect the primitive notion of dissimilarity to the pos-
sible preference of the decision maker for the options that she will choose in
the various opportunity sets. Why for example do a car and a bicycle look
intuitively more diﬀerent - or dissimilar - than two cars with slightly diﬀer-
ent characteristics ? It is, probably, because we think that most users of the
modes of transportation are likely to experiment less diﬀerence in satisfac-
tion in changing from one type of car to the other than in changing from one
type of car to the bike. These diﬀerences in satisfaction could, it seems to
us, be expressed in terms of a family of utility functions that a “reasonable”
decision maker could use when choosing between modes of transportation,
in just the same fashion as the notion of freedom of choice has been ex-
pressed in terms of a family of possible preferences for the decision maker.
The resort to cardinally meaningful utility functions, rather than mere ordi-
nal preference orderings, to explain a notion of dissimilarity represented by
a quadernary relation seems unavoidable. For it seems very diﬃcult ap r i o r i
to produce rankings of pairs of objects in terms of dissimilarity from a mere
knowledge of a set of rankings of the objects themselves. We think that the
exploration of this area is very promising for future research.
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